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By Mary Ann Chirba and Alice A. Noble
Given the ambitions and reach of the Affordable Care Act,
confusion about its intended and inadvertent impact is
inevitable. Since its enactment in 2010, the ACA has raised
legitimate and less grounded concerns among various
stakeholders ranging from individuals and employers facing
coverage mandates to States deciding whether and how to
implement the Act’s Medicaid expansions. One item has
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received far less attention even though it weighs heavily on any
provider engaged in the clinical practice of medicine: the ACA’s
impact on medical malpractice liability. The Act does little to
address medical malpractice head on. Nevertheless, physicians
and other providers, the states and even some members of
Congress have expressed concern that the Act will increase a
provider’s exposure to medical malpractice liability.
In response, the American Medical Association has drafted
model legislation to shield providers from newly created
malpractice claims resulting from the ACA. It would prevent
malpractice claimants from using federal or state practice
guidelines, quality measures, reimbursement criteria and the
like to establish or define the standard of care without expert
testimony. In Congress, a version of this model, H.R. 1473,
was introduced in the House of Representatives in 2012, and
again in April of 2013 [link: http://beta.congress.gov/bill/113th-
congress/house-bill/1473/cosponsors].
In April, the governor of Georgia signed H.B. 499 [link:
http://www.legis.ga.gov/legislation/en-
US/display/20132014/HB/499] into law, becoming the first state
to pass legislation based on the AMA model act.
This came on the heels of a Medical Association of Georgia
Advocacy Brief [link:
http://www.mag.org/sites/default/files/downloads/issue-brief-
provider-shield2-2013.pdf] stating that the ACA’s “guidelines”
concerning health care quality measures; payment
adjustments; hospital value-based purchasing; and value-based
payment modifiers “will raise [the medical malpractice] standard
to unreasonable levels by exposing physicians to a number of
new liabilities….” [Emphasis added]
It is too early to tell whether states will follow Georgia’s lead
and enact similar measures. What is clear is that such
“standard of care protection” or “provider liability shield”
legislation raises interesting questions about the ACA’s impact
on state medical malpractice law.
The intersection of federal standards and state personal injury
litigation against a regulated industry is nothing new. It has long
played a role, for instance, in product liability claims ranging
from medical drugs and devices to motor vehicles.  The
literature is already quite deep as to whether federal regulations
preempt state requirements or have evidentiary value at trial,
and we will not add to it today. What is of particular interest
with the Georgia law and, therefore, will be the focus of this
discussion is: (1) why the ACA has fueled concerns of
expanded malpractice liability, and (2) whether the Georgia law
achieves any real gains in shielding physicians or other health
care providers from malpractice liability beyond what already
exists under state law.
Put simply, we consider: why was the Georgia law passed, and
does it really accomplish anything?
A.  Georgia Malpractice Law
In a medical malpractice case, the standard of care under state
law is generally based on actual or “customary” practice. Expert
testimony is generally required to determine what the standard
of care is and whether it was breached or followed in the case
at hand. Quality and practice guidelines have been used by
both plaintiffs and defendants as some evidence of the
standard of care, but do not establish that standard on their
own. [1] Rather, they are introduced through the testimony of
an expert witness who can authenticate the reliability of the
guidelines or standards and can provide the necessary link
between the guidelines or standards and medical “custom.”
Georgia’s new liability protection statute provides, in pertinent
part, that in any civil action for medical malpractice or product
liability:
[T]he development, recognition, or
implementation of any guideline by any public
or private payor or the establishment of any
payment standard or reimbursement criteria
under any federal law or regulations related to
health care shall not be construed, without
competent expert testimony establishing the
appropriate standard of care, to establish a legal
basis for negligence or the standard of care or
duty of care owed by a health care provider.
The provision goes on to provide similar protection to the
plaintiff by preventing a defendant’s compliance with such
standards from establishing due care without, again, competent
expert testimony.  Similarly, H.R. 1473 § 2 (a) states that “the
development, recognition, or implementation of any guideline or
other standard under any Federal health care provision shall
not be construed to establish the standard of acre or duty of
care owed by a health care provider to a patient in any medical
malpractice case.” [Emphasis added.]
The Georgia law focuses solely on administrative criteria,
guidelines, and standards, expressly excluding from the
definition of such terms those criteria, guidelines, and
standards “relating to medical treatment, quality of care, or best
practices.”  Based on comments by supporters of the Georgia
law, such “administrative criteria, guidelines, and standards”
would include readmission rates, complication rates, payment
withholding or adjustments based on performance criteria.[2]
(The federal H.R. 1473 version refers to “guideline or other
standard under any Federal health car provision” without further
definition.)
Thus, Georgia’s new law does not preclude the admission of
guidelines, standards, criteria, etc., as evidence that the
standard of care was met or breached.  It simply insists that
using them to establish the standard of care be done through
accompanying expert testimony. [3]  Indeed, without expert
testimony that could be subject to cross examination or other
challenge at trial, a court would be hard pressed to determine
whether its admissibility or relevance to the case at hand.
With this in mind, we turn to an examination of whether the
ACA’s guidelines, standards, etc., impose the kind of new
liability risks that should concern physicians and other health
care providers, at least for the reasons proffered by the Georgia
shield law’s supporters.
B.  The ACA and Medicare Payment Provisions: Cause for
Concern?
An overarching goal of the ACA and earlier Medicare provisions
is to improve the quality of health care and the efficiency with
which it is delivered.  For example, the ACA expands
Medicare’s existing uses of quality criteria by developing
additional measures; linking  quality patient care to provider
reimbursement; and increasing transparency through broader
public access to information on providers and quality. It further
seeks to improve the quality of care, increase administrative
efficiency, reform provider reimbursement, and promote patient
outcomes research by incentivizing and expanding the use of
electronic health records (EHRs) and other health information
technology (HIT).
Because these and other initiatives are designed to improve
both quality and efficiency, they are by definition, intended to
influence the practice of medicine. Their implementation will
surely affect what constitutes ordinary or customary practice
and, consequently, affect what the standard of care is and the
imposition of liability based on that standard.   
Beyond the ACA’s impact on the content of existing standards
of care, however, proponents of the Georgia-type provider
shield law fear the Act will create new and distinct bases for
liability. According to the Medical Association of Georgia’s
Advocacy Brief, “states have the constitutional authority to
amend their laws to prevent these kinds of federal provisions
from being used in medical liability lawsuits that are filed in the
state.” This is misguided at best in at least two respects. First,
the ACA does not impose new bases for liability. Second, even
if it did, a state would have no authority, constitutional or
otherwise, to override federal payment reforms for federally
financed programs. Moreover, despite traditional state oversight
of the practice of medicine, states have no power to preclude a
federal law from influencing the practice of medicine.
According to proponents of the Georgia law, these are just a
few of the ways in which the ACA creates new liability risks for
health care providers:[4]
The development of health care quality measures.
The development of hospital readmission measures,
which are used to reduce payments to hospitals with
excessive rates of readmission for patients with certain
conditions.
The development of hospital-acquired conditions
measures, which will reduce or deny Medicare or
Medicaid payments for treating certain hospital-acquired
conditions.
The Medicare shared savings program that encourages,
but does not require certain Medicare providers to form
Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) which will
assume financial risk for meeting specific performance
goals and in return be eligible for additional payments for
meeting or exceeding CMS’s predetermined objectives.
The use of value-based payment modifiers to award
financial incentive payments to providers that met CMS-
determined, quality based performance standards.
The payment adjustments and value-based purchasing
initiatives are largely accomplished through the ACA’s Medicare
payment reforms. Therefore, the federal “guidelines” targeted
by the Georgia law were implemented through Congress’s
Article I tax and spending power. By deciding to participate in
the Medicare program and receive Medicare payments, a
provider agrees to comply with the federal government’s
Medicare payment provisions including those added by the
ACA.
The ACA’s payment, quality and similar measures go to the
very heart of its cost and quality reforms – and what keeps that
heart beating is data. More data on patient outcomes and
provider compliance with quality measures will be collected
than ever before. Public reporting of certain measures on both
the institutional and individual physician level will be expanded
under the ACA, as well. Payment will be increasingly tied to
performance–from meeting reporting requirements, to satisfying
quality measures, to readmitting patients with certain conditions
at unacceptable intervals, to preventing hospital-acquired
infections– as fee for service reimbursement shifts to value-
based reimbursement. Although these reforms target Medicare
and Medicaid programs, their impact may affect health care in
general over time as other payors adopt similar reimbursement
methods.
Will these changes affect “medical custom” or the standard of
care?  Hopefully yes and hopefully, in a positive way.  By
increasing quality and decreasing costs, the ACA should raise
the standard of care as practice variability and waste decline. 
In theory at least, improved quality should lead to fewer medical
malpractice suits (although we stop short of that prediction,
given other factors at play – e.g., more individuals with more
access to more providers and more visits, the use of financial
incentives, etc.).
C.  Does the State Shield Law Provide Value Added
to Physicians and Patients?
Although the ACA’s quality initiatives will affect what the
standard of care is, it does not create new and independent
bases of malpractice liability. Therefore, the concerns that
spawned the Georgia legislation, the AMA model act, and the
Congressional bills seem misplaced.
Collecting and analyzing data on hospital readmission or
hospital-based infections will not change a malpractice suit’s
basic inquiry into whether a specific provider breached the
standard of care in treating a specific patient. Even data
available at the physician level would have little if any bearing
on a claim of negligence brought by a specific plaintiff-patient
against a specific treating physician.
Metrics for institutions that have some oversight of specific
physicians and their practice may be somewhat more useful to
malpractice litigants.  For example, evidence that a hospital has
been lax in its oversight of infection prevention protocols might
be admissible as evidence of the hospital’s negligence given a
suitable set of facts. This is nothing new however, except that
now more data may be available (assuming it is discoverable,
admissible, and useful as evidence.)  And again, the Georgia
law would not prevent the use of such evidence, as long as it is
introduced through an expert witness as has always been the
case with general evidentiary requirements of state medical
malpractice laws.
D.  Time to Focus on the Real Problems
We have considered in past writings how the ACA has been
misunderstood and even mythologized, ranging from it
constituting a federal takeover of health care (it is not) to being
unnecessary for young adults who do not want coverage (they
do). We worry that myth-making is at work again here.
The answers to our initial questions of why the Georgia law
passed and whether it accomplished anything will surely
disappoint the shield law’s backers.  Georgia’s provider shield
law was passed to address provider fears that the ACA would
impose new liability risks separate and apart from those
already existing under state malpractice law. As explained,
those concerns are unfounded; the ACA may influence what
constitutes the standard of care just as any technological,
societal or legal development may influence that standard. The
ACA does not, however, create new forms, bases or versions
of malpractice liability. As a result, Georgia’s and similar state
provider shield laws are unnecessary and do nothing to
assuage the quite legitimate liability concerns of providers.
For this reason, those who are concerned about new liability
risks stemming from health reform are off-track with Georgia-
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type legislation.  We agree that examining the ACA for liability
loopholes is an important exercise. It is a complex statute with
many moving parts.  Compounding its complexity is the fact
that the law gives regulators significant discretion to define its
scope, meaning, and application.  For these reasons and more,
stakeholders must be vigilant in their assessment of the ACA
as it moves toward full implementation. That assessment,
however, should be based on more than mythology.
[Cross-posted from HealthLawProf Blog]
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